A dismal second investigation has determined that victims of the Manchester
Arena terror attack were kept “waiting in vain” and “desperate for rescue,
which did not come.
The “inadequacies” in the emergency response also meant that at least one
of the 22 victims’ deaths may have been avoided.
Because of a “loss of communication” between emergency services, paramedics
and fire crews were not deployed, leaving both rescuers and those injured
to hear “ambulance sirens outside,” according to the study.
Suicide bomber Salman Abedi exploded a device at the end of an Ariana
Grande concert in May 2017, killing Saffie-Rose Roussos, eight, and John
Atkinson, 28.
According to an assessment on the tragic repercussions of the explosion,
the youngest victim could have been spared if the rescue operation had been
done differently.
It also concluded that Mr. Atkinson “would have probably lived” if the
emergency response had been better coordinated and he had been transferred
to the hospital sooner.
The chairman of the Inquiry, Sir John Saunders, stated that he had “no
doubt that lives were saved by the emergency response” and that they were
doing their best, but that “their best was not good enough” in some
situations.
He went on to say that the emergency services’ performance was “far below
the standard that it should have been.”
Sir John Saunders also lauded the “heroic gestures” of bystanders who
risked their own safety to assist the dying and injured.
He described the City Room as a “war zone,” saying that entering or
remaining there to help the injured “took considerable fortitude.”
When the improvised device exploded on May 22, 2017, it killed 22
individuals and injured hundreds more.
The victims ranged in age from eight to 51 years.
Sir John Saunders stated in the second of three studies, looking into the
emergency services’ reaction, that “a great lot went wrong,” including
communication, not learning from prior tragedies, and specialist plans
being out of date or not known by everyone.
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) failed to lead the response in accordance
with guidance, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) failed to
arrive “when they could provide the greatest assistance,” and North West
Ambulance Service (NWAS) failed to send enough paramedics into the City
Room, according to his damning report.
However, he stated that while his assessment criticised those he believed
“made mistakes,” he “recognised the huge circumstances they were acting
under” and was not shocked that things went wrong.
However, he stressed that his role was to guarantee that mistakes were
discovered in order to avoid them in the future.
The 900-page report’s key findings
– A lack of contact between emergency responders, both on the ground and
via radio.
– Force Duty Officer Dale Sexton’s failure to notify other emergency
services of his proclamation of Operation Plato, the code name for the
pre-planned emergency reaction to a rampaging terrorist.
– The North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) experienced delays in bringing
ambulances and paramedics to the location.
– There was a failure to get stretchers to the City Room to assist with the
evacuation of the injured.
– The Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) failed to attend
on scene and contribute to the removal of the injured that its officers
could have.
– No one in a senior position in GMFRS was able to seize control of the
situation throughout the key period of the response.
Sir John Saunders addressed the responses of GMP, NWAS, and GMFRS, stating
that each had its own risk assessments, resulting in different results.
He stated that the “differing approaches to risk were starkly clear,” and
that the regions in which each was prepared to operate reflected this.
Sir John Saunders issued 149 suggestions in response to the 900-page
report, including the regular assessment of major incident plans (at least
every six months) and the inclusion of non-specialists in multi-agency
training exercises.
He also suggested that regular “high-fidelity training” be implemented to
provide emergency responders with “greater experience of the stress,
strain, and tempo of a no-notice attack.”
The report also advised that the overarching emergency service groups aim
to foster a culture of responding to incidents as soon as possible, rather
than being risk adverse, unless there is a compelling reason not to.
In total, 291 witnesses and specialists testified, 172,000 documents were
analysed, and the long-awaited report on the emergency response was
released today (3 November).
Arena terror attack were kept “waiting in vain” and “desperate for rescue,
which did not come.
The “inadequacies” in the emergency response also meant that at least one
of the 22 victims’ deaths may have been avoided.
Because of a “loss of communication” between emergency services, paramedics
and fire crews were not deployed, leaving both rescuers and those injured
to hear “ambulance sirens outside,” according to the study.
Suicide bomber Salman Abedi exploded a device at the end of an Ariana
Grande concert in May 2017, killing Saffie-Rose Roussos, eight, and John
Atkinson, 28.
According to an assessment on the tragic repercussions of the explosion,
the youngest victim could have been spared if the rescue operation had been
done differently.
It also concluded that Mr. Atkinson “would have probably lived” if the
emergency response had been better coordinated and he had been transferred
to the hospital sooner.
The chairman of the Inquiry, Sir John Saunders, stated that he had “no
doubt that lives were saved by the emergency response” and that they were
doing their best, but that “their best was not good enough” in some
situations.
He went on to say that the emergency services’ performance was “far below
the standard that it should have been.”
Sir John Saunders also lauded the “heroic gestures” of bystanders who
risked their own safety to assist the dying and injured.
He described the City Room as a “war zone,” saying that entering or
remaining there to help the injured “took considerable fortitude.”
When the improvised device exploded on May 22, 2017, it killed 22
individuals and injured hundreds more.
The victims ranged in age from eight to 51 years.
Sir John Saunders stated in the second of three studies, looking into the
emergency services’ reaction, that “a great lot went wrong,” including
communication, not learning from prior tragedies, and specialist plans
being out of date or not known by everyone.
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) failed to lead the response in accordance
with guidance, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) failed to
arrive “when they could provide the greatest assistance,” and North West
Ambulance Service (NWAS) failed to send enough paramedics into the City
Room, according to his damning report.
However, he stated that while his assessment criticised those he believed
“made mistakes,” he “recognised the huge circumstances they were acting
under” and was not shocked that things went wrong.
However, he stressed that his role was to guarantee that mistakes were
discovered in order to avoid them in the future.
The 900-page report’s key findings
– A lack of contact between emergency responders, both on the ground and
via radio.
– Force Duty Officer Dale Sexton’s failure to notify other emergency
services of his proclamation of Operation Plato, the code name for the
pre-planned emergency reaction to a rampaging terrorist.
– The North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) experienced delays in bringing
ambulances and paramedics to the location.
– There was a failure to get stretchers to the City Room to assist with the
evacuation of the injured.
– The Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) failed to attend
on scene and contribute to the removal of the injured that its officers
could have.
– No one in a senior position in GMFRS was able to seize control of the
situation throughout the key period of the response.
Sir John Saunders addressed the responses of GMP, NWAS, and GMFRS, stating
that each had its own risk assessments, resulting in different results.
He stated that the “differing approaches to risk were starkly clear,” and
that the regions in which each was prepared to operate reflected this.
Sir John Saunders issued 149 suggestions in response to the 900-page
report, including the regular assessment of major incident plans (at least
every six months) and the inclusion of non-specialists in multi-agency
training exercises.
He also suggested that regular “high-fidelity training” be implemented to
provide emergency responders with “greater experience of the stress,
strain, and tempo of a no-notice attack.”
The report also advised that the overarching emergency service groups aim
to foster a culture of responding to incidents as soon as possible, rather
than being risk adverse, unless there is a compelling reason not to.
In total, 291 witnesses and specialists testified, 172,000 documents were
analysed, and the long-awaited report on the emergency response was
released today (3 November).
